A RIGHT TO NO MEANINGFUL REVIEW: THE
AFTERMATH OF SHALALA v. ILLINOIS COUNCIL ON
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No one ever looks forward to entering a nursing home because it means
leaving the things most dear to them: family, home, and independence.
Nevertheless, without the current nursing home system,2 many elderly and
disabled persons, who require comprehensive treatment, would not have access to
necessary care.3 A viable nursing home industry is essential to our health care
system, and regulations need to carefully balance public health and safety
concerns against concern for the operational viability of the sector.4 This balance
has been disrupted by the abrogation of nursing home Due Process rights when in
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”). While the
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Three main parties fund nursing homes: Medicare, Medicaid, and private
parties. Of the payments received by nursing homes in 2001, Medicare accounted for
11.3%, Medicaid for 67%, and private payors were responsible for 38.9%. See TABLE
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Distribution and Average Annual Percent Change by Source of Funds: Selected
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billion in 2000 and $11.6 billion in 2001. Id.
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2000, nursing homes provided care to 1.6 million elderly and disabled persons
and by 2050 nursing homes are projected to provide care to 6.6 million elderly
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Constitution,5 the Social Security Act,6 and Medicare regulations7 mandate that
nursing homes be afforded Due Process rights when challenging noncompliance
findings, HHShas unduly restricted nursing homes’ rights by denying them
access to Medicare8 compliance hearings.
Congress tried to standardize the requirements of Due Process of law
among federal administrative agency’s with the passage of the Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”).9 Section 554 of the APA grants individuals a hearing on
the record to challenge the deprivation of liberty or property,10 while sections 702
and 704 guarantee individuals the right to appeal an agency’s findings to federal
court.11 These rights to a hearing remain subordinate to each agency’s governing
statute,12 which often limit the structure of the hearing process and the right to
federal review.13
For instance, section 1320a-7a(c)(2) of the Social Security Act mandates
that HHS provide nursing homes with a hearing on the record to appeal findings
of alleged noncompliance with the Medicare regulations.14 Access to agency
5
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review is limited by Section 1320a-7a(j)(1), which incorporates sections 405(g)
and (h), that prohibits federal review of a case until HHS reviews the case and
issues a final ruling.15 HHS has further limited the Medicare compliance hearing
process by denying nursing homes the right to challenge findings of
noncompliance,16 even though the findings are used against them in future
proceedings to deprive the nursing home of property, such as Medicare
payments.17 This denial of nursing homes’ Due Process rights in administrative
hearing is significant because it is emblematic of the Federal administrative
agency system18 that was upheld by the Supreme Court’s decision in the case
styled as Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc. [hereinafter Ill.
Council].19
In Ill. Council, the Illinois Council on Long Term Care (“Council”)20
argued that the statutory provisions that barred nursing homes from bringing a
case in federal court until they had exhausted their administrative remedies,
effectively denying nursing homes Due Process.21 The Council averred that as a
practical matter it was impossible to exhaust their administrative remedies, and
thus negated their ability to seek federal review for procedural and Constitutional
issues.22 In response, the Secretary of HHS23 (“Secretary”) asserted that nursing
homes were afforded the right to procedural Due Process protections, which
included “the right of any dissatisfied nursing home to a full evidentiary hearing
15
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to challenge any findings of noncompliance.”24 The Supreme Court ruled that
nursing homes were barred from seeking federal review of a case until they had
presented their case to HHS and received a final ruling, even if the claims were
based on Constitutional issues.25
Notwithstanding the assertions made in Ill. Council, HHS has whittled
away the very procedural Due Process rights that the Court relied upon in its
ruling in Ill. Council. Since Ill. Council, the Administrative Law Judges (“ALJs”)
have consistently ruled, and the Departmental Appeals Board (“DAB”)26 has
affirmed, that if HHS fails to impose or rescinds the remedies imposed for a
nursing home’s alleged noncompliance, nursing homes do not have a right to a
hearing even though the findings of noncompliance are not rescinded,27 nor
removed from the HHS website,28 and are the basis for the imposition of remedies
for future incidents of noncompliance.29 In fact, this proposition was codified in
the Code of Federal Regulations in 1996, four years before the Supreme Court
heard and issued it’s ruling in Ill. Council.30 Many of the ALJs have drastically
reduced the full evidentiary hearing process31 to direct testimony through
submission of affidavit and in-person cross-examination of witnesses.32
As a result of these changes, nursing homes have been left without an
opportunity to be heard in the agency proceeding and in federal court before the
loss of their property, namely Medicare payments.33 This contravenes the letter
and spirit of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment that guarantees a
right to process for the loss of property. In order to comply with traditional
notions of procedural Due Process required by the Constitution, the Social
Security Act, the Medicare regulations, and the APA, I argue that HHS must
provide nursing homes with hearing rights in all cases and allow them to bypass
24
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the administrative system if the only challenge concerns Constitutional or
statutory procedures.
This article will examine the failure of HHS to provide nursing homes
with procedural Due Process rights by analyzing the Supreme Court decision in
Ill. Council. Section II will briefly trace the history of Due Process in HHS
hearings. The evolution of the survey and certification of nursing homes and the
Due Process rights granted by HHS in nursing home hearings is discussed in
Section III. Section IV reviews the pivotal case of Ill. Council, which barred
nursing homes’ access to federal courts to challenge the Constitutionality of HHS’
actions, while the problems with the case and possible solutions to rectify these
problems are addressed in Section V.
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF DUE PROCESS IN HHS HEARINGS
The cornerstone of the American justice system, the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, guarantees that no person will
“be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”34
Unfortunately, individuals are not always granted these Due Process rights when
challenging the deprivation of liberty or property by Federal administrative
agencies.35 The abrogation of these protections during Federal administrative
Agency adjudications has created an eternal tension between the agencies, the
individuals regulated by the agencies, and the federal courts. This tension
pervades the lives of every individual and business as Federal administrative
agencies, such as HHS,36 govern vital aspects of all daily living.
The two major events concerning Due Process in HHS administrative
hearings were: the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 and the
Supreme Court’s decisions discussing the Social Security Act and Medicare’s bar
to federal review.37 Each of these actions constituted either an expansion or
constriction of Due Process rights in HHS that have profoundly affected the Due
Process rights of nursing homes.
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Education Organization Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-88, § 509(e), 93 Stat. 695 (1979)
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A. The Administrative Procedure Act – Fairness in Administrative
Agency hearings.
As early as the 1920s, Congress began delegating broad powers to Federal
administrative agencies to protect the health, safety and welfare of the public, but
the Supreme Court regularly overturned these delegations.38 After 1935, the
Supreme Court upheld broad Congressional delegation of power to Federal
administrative agencies, culminating in several cases in which the Court upheld
delegation of power to agencies with little to no standards.39 With the
proliferation of Federal administrative agencies, Congress became concerned with
the potential for administrative bias in Federal administrative hearings because
agencies were granted significant discretion in their hearing procedures.40
Because the agency served as the investigator, the prosecutor, and the judge,
Congress questioned whether the agency could be genuinely impartial.41 There
were a series of bills introduced in Congress in the 1930s and 1940s aimed at
correcting the problems of administrative tribunal review.42
In 1937, President Roosevelt also became concerned with the fairness of
the administrative review process and created the Committee on Administrative

38

See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
39
See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944) (Court upheld broad
delegation of power to Price Administrator to regulate commodity pricing); Lichter v.
United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948) (Court upheld statute giving the executive branch the
power to recover profits from war contracts deemed excessive without defining what
constituted excessive); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947) (Court upheld
Congressional delegation of power to Federal Loan Bank Board to issue regulations for
when a conservator could be appointed to take over a mismanaged federal savings and
loan association). The Court’s decisions in these cases, leading to the independence of
agencies from executive, legislative, and judicial controls, solidified the place of the
Federal administrative agency as the “fourth branch” of the federal government. See
KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (3d
ed. 1994).
40
Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 37-38 (1950) citing S. 5154, 70th
Cong. (2d Sess. 1929).
41
Wong Yang Sung, 339 U.S. at 41-42 citing ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT
IN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE
ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT 36-37 (1937).
42
S. 1835, 73d Cong. (1st Sess. 1933); S. 3787, H.R. 12297, 74th Cong. (2d
Sess. 1936); S. 3676, 75th Cong. (3d Sess. 1938); H.R. 6324, H.R. 4235, H.R. 4236, S.
915, S. 916, 76th Cong. (1st Sess. 1939); S. 674, S. 675, S. 918, H.R. 3464, H.R. 4238,
H.R. 4782, 77th Cong. (1st Sess. 1941); H.R. 4314, H.R. 5081, H.R. 5237, S. 2030, 78th
Cong. (2d Sess. 1944); H.R. 1203, S. 7, 79th Cong. (1st Sess. 1945).
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Management.43 Two years later, the President also directed the Attorney General
to establish a new “committee of eminent lawyers, jurists, scholars, and
administrators to review the entire administrative process in the various
departments of the executive Government and to recommend improvements,
including the suggestion of any needed legislation.”44 Before the Attorney
General’s Committee Report was issued, Congress passed the Walter-Logan bill
that standardized the administrative review process. The Walter-Logan bill
provided for a standard hearing process that included a right to appeal agency
actions in writing, a right to a hearing before a three panel board, a right to call
witnesses and compel documents, and a right to appeal the decision of the U.S.
Circuit Courts of Appeal.45 President Roosevelt vetoed the bill,46 acknowledging
the need for reform, but delaying his decision until the Attorney General
Committee’s Report was issued.47
To instill a sense of fairness and eradicate the bias and arbitrary nature of
agency hearings, the Attorney General Committee’s Report (“the Report”)
recommended that agencies completely separate adjudication functions and
personnel from those investigating and prosecuting claims.48 However, in
comparison to the Walter-Logan bill, the Report provided generalized guidelines
for attaining these goals rather than providing specific procedures. Congress used
the Report to craft the bill that was later entitled the Administrative Procedure Act
of 1946.49 Even though the broad language in the Report allowed the agency
more flexibility in fulfilling the requirements of fairness, Congress tried to
provide safeguards in the APA by making it clear that all agency decisions were
reviewable by the federal courts unless Congress clearly withheld that right. The
Senate Committee on the Judiciary stated:
Very rarely do statutes withhold judicial review. It has never been
the policy of Congress to prevent the administration of its own
statutes from being judicially confined to the scope of authority
43

ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT
37 (1937).
44
The quoted statement is from President Roosevelt's message to Congress on
December 18, 1940, vetoing the Walter-Logan Act of 1940. See H.R. 6324, 76th Cong. §
3-4 (3d Sess. 1940).
45
86 CONG. REC. 13674 (1940).
46
S. 915, H.R. 6324, 76th Cong. (1st Sess. 1939). See also 86 CONG. REC.
13942--3 (1940), reprinted in H.R. DOC. NO. 986, 76th Cong. (3d Sess. 1940).
47
86 CONG. REC. at 13943.
48
FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 7 (1941) contained in S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong. (1st Sess.
1941).
49
S. REP. No. 79-752, at 26 (1945).

7

granted or to the objectives specified. Its policy could not be
otherwise, for in such a case statutes would in effect be blank
checks drawn to the credit of some administrative officer or
board.50
The House of Representatives Committee on Judiciary further said that
there should be judicial review and stressed that when that review is limited the
intent is clear.51 The APA also afforded the right to some procedural safeguards
on the agency level once the agency’s governing statute granted hearing rights.52
Most significantly, APA §554 provided that:
every case of adjudication required by statute to be determined on
the record after opportunity of an agency hearing.53
This section explicitly grants a right to a full evidentiary hearing on the
record. Although, Congress enacted the APA of 1946 to address issues of
fairness in the administrative hearing process,54 these rights to a hearing remain
subordinate to each agency’s governing statute,55 which often limits the structure
of the hearing process and the right to federal review.56 For instance, the
requirement of exhausting all administrative remedies before bringing a case in
federal court only applies when provided by an agency’s governing statute.57
This is the case in hearings conducted by HHS in the long-term care arena.58 The
Social Security Act limits the reviewability of claims in both the administrative
agency process and in the federal courts. Thus, after the passage of the APA, the
main question for individuals challenging the actions of HHS under the Social
50

Bowen, 476 U.S. 667, 671 (1986), citing S. REP. NO. 79-752, at 26 (1945).
H.R. REP. NO. 79-1980 at 41 (1946).
52
5 U.S.C. § 554 (1994).
53
Id.
54
Pub. L. No. 89-554 (Sept. 6, 1966). See also FINAL REPORT OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 7 (1941)
contained in S. DOC. NO. 8, 77th Cong. (1st Sess. 1941).
55
5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 702, 704 (2004).
56
See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471
(1999) (The Court ruled that the exclusive clause of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) barred federal review of claims and
causes originating from the Attorney General’s action to commence proceedings,
adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.)
57
Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137 (1993).
58
See Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602 (1984); Dallas Healthcare, Inc. v. Health
& Human Servs. Comm’n, 921 F. Supp. 426 (N.D. Tex. 1996); Int’l Long Term Care,
Inc. v. Shalala, 947 F. Supp. 15 (D.D.C. 1996); Michigan Ass’n of Homes & Service for
the Aging, Inc. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 496 (6th Cir. 1997).
51
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Security Act was predicated on whether the agency had the right to limit federal
review of Constitutional issues even if it meant no right to meaningful review.
B. Can Federal Courts Review Due Process Challenges under the Social
Security Act?
Under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 405(h), federal courts are barred from
reviewing any Social Security action under 28 U.S.C. §§133159 and 134660 before
HHS has issued a final ruling. Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) states:
Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of
Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a party,
irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of
such decision by a civil action ... Such action shall be brought in
the district court of the United States.
(emphasis added).61 This review is further limited by 42 U.S.C. § 405(h), which
says:
No findings of fact or decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal, or
governmental agency except as herein provided. No action against
the United States, the Commissioner of Social Security, or any
officer or employee thereof shall be brought under section 1331 or
1346 of Title 28 to recover on any claim arising under this
subchapter.62
This bar to federal review before a final decision from the Secretary was
incorporated into the Medicare Act by 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7a(c)(2) and (j)(1).63
The “exhaustion” requirements in 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) & (h) has allowed the
Secretary to channel all claims through the agency process. In 1975, the Supreme
59

“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising
under the Constitution, Laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §1331 (2004).
60
“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction concurrent, with the Federal
Court of Claims of any civil claim against the United States for the recovery of any
internal-revenue tax or any other civil action or claim against the United States, not
exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of
Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied
contract with the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §§1346 (2004).
61
42 U.S.C. § 405 (g) (2004).
62
42 U.S.C. § 405 (h) (2004).
63
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(c)(1), nursing homes are granted a right to a
hearing. These hearing rights are limited by 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(c)(2), which makes 42
U.S.C. §§ 405 (g) & (h) applicable to nursing home hearings.
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Court decided a case entitled Weinberger v. Salfi,64 establishing a broad rule
barring all claims arising under the Social Security Act regardless of whether they
involved Constitutional or statutory challenges. In Salfi, a class action suit was
brought in federal district court challenging HHS’ denial of Social Security
benefits because of the duration of relationship requirement.65 According to the
duration requirement, the surviving spouse must have been married to the
deceased worker for at least nine months before the death of the worker to receive
Social Security benefits.66 The class represented both members that had been
denied and those that had not yet submitted claims for benefits.67 The class
asserted that the duration requirement was unconstitutional based on the Equal
Protection Clause, and requested the immediate payment of benefits.68 Even
though, neither party raised the issue of jurisdiction nor did the resolution of
jurisdiction issue resolve the entire case, the Supreme Court ruled that it did not
have subject matter jurisdiction over the members of the class that had not
presented their case to HHS.69 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(h), federal review was
barred until two steps had been completed: the case had first been presented to the
agency and the Secretary had issued a final ruling.70
The complaints argued that the section was merely an exhaustion
requirement.71 Courts usually require exhaustion “as a matter of preventing
premature interference with agency processes, so that the agency may function
efficiently and so that it may have an opportunity to correct its own errors, to
afford the parties and the courts the benefit of its experience and expertise, and to
compile a record which is adequate for judicial review.”72 The complaints argued
64

Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
Id. at 754.
66
Pub. L. No. 90-248 §§ 156(a) & (b), 81 Stat. 866 (1967) (codified as 42 U.S.C.
§§ 416(c)(5) & (e)(2) (1970)).
67
Salfi, 422 U.S. at 755.
68
Id. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California
ruled for the class and granted declaratory and injunctive relief. Id.
69
Id. at 787. The dissent, written by Justice Brennan and joined by Justice
Marshall, pointed out the fact that the jurisdictional issue was not raised by either party,
was only discussed in passing in the oral arguments, and did not resolve the entire case.
Id. at 787-89. Thus, the Court should not have discussed the jurisdiction issue. Id. at
789.
70
Id. at. 756.
71
Furthermore, the dissent contended that the channeling provision of 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(h) was merely an exhaustion requirement for questions of fact and statutory
interpretation. Id. at 789. To support this contention, Justice Brennan cited to the
legislative history when the amendment was passed and the Social Security Board’s
discussion of the statute immediately after is passage. Id. at 790-792.
72
Id. at 765. The two relevant exceptions to the exhaustion requirement in this
case are: futility of review and irreparable harm. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387
U.S. 136, 148-149 (1967); McKart v. U.S., 395 U.S. 185, 197-201 (1969).
65
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that completing the agency process was futile because the issue of
Constitutionality is outside the scope of the Secretary’s authority.73 The Supreme
Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) was not a mere exhaustion requirement, but
that the federal review bar prohibited all federal review save for those actions
mentioned in 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).74 The Court announced that 42 U.S.C. § 405(h)
was not limited to mere decisions of fact or law, but also applied to any action
seeking to recover under the Social Security Act including Constitutional
questions.75
Therefore, according to the Court, even Constitutional claims must first be
brought to the agency, so that the Secretary may determine if the claims can be
resolved under the Social Security Act.76 Because the members of the class were
seeking payment of Social Security benefits, their claims arose under the Act and
were not reviewable until the claims were first presented to HHS and the
Secretary issued a final ruling.77 Nevertheless, the members of the claim that had
presented their case to HHS were not barred by 42 U.S.C. § 405(h), so the court
went on to address the substantive issue of the complaint.78 The Supreme Court’s
decision to impose the subject matter jurisdiction requirement for all cases arising
under the Social Security Act regardless of the content of the claim seemingly cut
off Social Security claimants’ access to the federal courts, but this was not the
case in Matthews v. Eldridge.79
The Supreme Court allowed the Social Security recipient in Eldridge to
bring a claim in federal court challenging the Constitutionality of the procedures
afforded in a Social Security hearing even though he had not fulfilled the subject
matter jurisdiction requirements of announced in Salfi. In Eldridge, Mr. Eldridge
challenged the Secretary’s decision to revoke his Social Security disability
benefits prior to providing an evidentiary hearing.80 Eldridge received a letter
from the state agency administering Social Security benefits that his disability had
ceased and thus his payments would be terminated.81 Eldridge responded to the
agency in writing disputing the characterization of his medical condition.82 The
state agency reviewed his response, but issued a final determination that
73

Salfi, 422 U.S. at 765.
Id. at 758.
75
Id. at 762.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 785. The dissent also asserted that the case did not arise under the Social
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Eldridge’s disability had ceased.83 HHS accepted the state’s determination and
sent a letter to Eldridge stating that his benefits would be cancelled in July and
granted him appeal rights.84 Instead of appealing the determination, Eldridge
filed suit in federal court challenging the Constitutionality of HHS’ practice of
granting only a post-termination hearing to appeal the termination of disability
benefits rather than a pre-termination hearing. He also requested immediate
reinstatement of his benefits pending such a hearing.85 The Secretary moved for
dismissal based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Salfi that 42 U.S.C. § 405(h)
required Eldridge to present the case to HHS and receive a final ruling before
federal review.86
The Supreme Court ruled that Eldridge’s letter to the state disputing the
characterization of his medical condition fulfilled the “present requirement” of 42
U.S.C. § 405(h), even though Eldridge did not raise any Constitutional question in
his letter.87 This was not fatal to his claim because 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) only
required a final decision on the issues relating to the Social Security Act, not that
all issues be presented to HHS.88 The Court also found that the finality
requirement was waivable and waived the requirement because Eldridge’s case
was so significant “that deference to the agency’s judgment is inappropriate.”89
Furthermore, Eldridge’s Constitutional claims were collateral to his claim for
future Social Security benefits. The Court reasoned that Eldridge’s claim
regarding the timing of the benefits hearing under the Social Security Act did not
arise under the Social Security Act because without this review Eldridge’s
Constitutional claim would never be addressed.90 Hence, the Court seemingly
created an exception for Eldridge that if 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) would serve to bar
federal review, then the case could be filed in federal court after presentment to
agency. The Court’s decision in Eldridge was a major shift from its decision in
Salfi barring federal review until both steps were fulfilled. The exception applied
in Eldridge was a mere aberration illustrated by the Court’s subsequent decisions
that returned to the strict requirements set forth in Salfi requiring presentment and
a final agency decision before allowing federal review of an agency’s action.
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In Heckler v. Ringer,91 four Medicare recipients brought an action in
federal court based on federal question jurisdiction challenging the disallowance
of benefits to cover a surgical procedure to relieve respiratory distress.92
Medicare patients seeking reimbursement for the procedure were awarded money
to cover their surgery costs until 1980 when HHS issued a formal administrative
ruling prohibiting reimbursement for the surgery.93 Three of the four claimants
had already had the surgery before 1980 and were seeking reimbursement, while
Ringer, the fourth claimant, could not afford the surgery and was seeking money
to undergo surgery. 94 Each claimant was at a different stage in the appeal
process, but none of the claimants had received a final ruling from the Secretary.95
The Supreme Court dismissed three of the claimants’ cases because they had their
surgery before the Secretary issued the administrative ruling and were not barred
from reimbursement.96
The only remaining claimant, Ringer, had requested payment from HHS,
but the Secretary was unwilling to issue a ruling in his case until he underwent the
surgery. Ringer had not undergone the surgery because he was indigent and was
seeking a judgment to obtain the money necessary for the surgery. In response to
Ringer’s case, the Court ruled that section 405(h) applied to his claim because
although he maintained that the administrative ruling was unconstitutional, he was
still seeking reimbursement of the award of benefits under the Medicare Act.97
Thus, his claims arose under the Medicare Act.98 According to the Court,
regardless of whether his claim challenged the procedures of HHS or the
substance of HHS’ actions, 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) barred federal courts from ruling
on these claims, if they arose under the Medicare Act, until a final action from the
Secretary.99

91

Ringer, 466 U.S. 602 (1984).
Id. at 605. Their claims were dismissed by the Untied States District Court for
the Central District of California for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and reinstated by
the United State Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
93
Medicare Program, 45 Fed. Reg. 71426-71427 (1980). (Because of the lack of
acceptance by the medical community over the effectiveness of the surgery, the Secretary
issued an administrative instruction to all fiscal intermediaries and ALJs that no payment
is to be made for Medicare claims for the surgical procedure to relive respiratory distress.
Ringer, 466 U.S. at 607).
94
Ringer, 466 U.S. at 609.
95
Id. at 610.
96
Id.
97
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(c)(1), nursing homes are granted a right to a
hearing. These hearing rights are limited by 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(c)(2), which makes 42
U.S.C. §§ 405 (g) & (h) applicable to nursing home hearings.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 615.
92

13

Even though the Secretary had drafted an exception to the subject matter
jurisdiction requirement to allow cases to go to federal court after the
reconsideration stage “when the only factor precluding award of benefits is a
statutory provision which the claimant challenges as unconstitutional,”100 the
Court ruled that the exception did not apply in this case because the Constitutional
claims were inextricably linked with their benefits claims.101 Furthermore, the
Court ruled that the claimant seeking money to have the surgery still had an
avenue of review even if there was a presumption against reimbursement. Thus,
Ringer’s case was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Effectively,
this left Ringer with no avenue for review because he had no right to agency
review until after he underwent the surgery, which he could not afford to have.102
Although the Court’s decision in Ringer left him with no meaningful review, the
Court did not allow this as an exception to section 405(h) until its decision in
Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians.103
In Bowen, an association of family physicians filed a lawsuit challenging
the validity of a HHS regulation permitting lower payments for similar services
based on the type of physician providing the care.104 The Secretary argued that
Congress had prohibited any federal review of amount determinations under
Medicare Part B.105 According to the Secretary, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) only granted
hearing rights to those under Medicare Part A and 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) precluded
all administrative and judicial review of claims not noted in 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
The Supreme Court ruled that the legislative history of the APA proved
otherwise. Specifically, the Senate and House Judiciary Committee Report stated
that there is a presumption of review unless explicitly stated.106 Moreover, the
legislative history from 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), (h) confined all amount
determinations solely to the agency “to avoid overloading the courts with quite
minor affairs.”107 Therefore, the Court ruled because Congress neither granted
100
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HHS the authority to review all other claims nor clearly prohibited federal review
of these issues, the physicians’ claims regarding the Constitutionality of the
regulations was reviewable. Finally, the physicians did not have to present the
claim to HHS or wait until the Secretary issued a final ruling as required by Salfi
and Ringer because in this instance there was no agency hearing process, so the
only means of review was federal review.
The Court ruled that Congress rarely withholds judicial review and it is
questionable whether Congress can prohibit any federal review of issues
concerning Constitutional questions.108 The Court’s decision in Bowen that
Congress did not intend to prevent federal review harkens back to the principles
espoused by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary when discussing the APA.
Nevertheless, the Court’s decisions in Salfi and Ringer showed that if HHS
provided any means by which individuals could obtain agency review, the
requirements of section 405(h) had to be fulfilled before submitting the case for
federal review. HHS stretched the limitations of the Supreme Court’s rulings
when it implemented a strict Medicare regulatory scheme to regulate nursing
homes in 1995, which on paper provides agency review, but in reality forecloses
agency and federal review.
III. HISTORY OF THE MEDICARE NURSING HOME HEARING
PROCESS GOVERNED BY HHS
The principal health care program funded and directly administered by
HHS is the Health Insurance for the Elderly and Disabled program, better known
as Medicare.109 Medicare consists of three parts that pay for sundry care for the
elderly: Part A (Hospital Insurance), Part B (Supplemental Medical Insurance),
and Part C (Medicare Managed Care).110 Part A covers nursing home care for
persons over the age of 65, if residence at a nursing home follows within 30 days
108
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of a hospitalization of three or more days, and is certified as medically
necessary.111 Medicare covers up to 100 days of care received at a nursing
home.112 Nursing homes are subject to Medicare regulations as a result of their
receipt of Medicare funds.
To participate in the Medicare program, nursing homes must submit to a
certification process, which includes a thorough inspection of the facility and
patients to ensure that they comply with the Medicare regulations.113 Once the
nursing home is certified to participate in Medicare, HHS contracts with State
health agencies114 to conduct annual re-certification inspections of each Medicare
certified nursing home.115 This re-certification process is called survey and
certification.116 HHS aggressively regulates the nursing home industry through its
survey and certification process, citing nursing homes for noncompliance with the
Medicare regulations.117 The federal nursing home survey and certification
process under Medicare has changed substantially since its advent in 1965.118
The most significant changes occurred with the passage of the Nursing Home
Reform Act, a part of the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1987.119 The Nursing
Home Reform Act not only changed the survey and certification regulations, but
it also altered the structure of the hearing process used by nursing homes to
challenge the survey findings.
A. The Evolution of Survey and Certification Regulations Used to Police Nursing
Homes
Since the passage of the Social Security Act of 1935, the federal
government has been providing funding to nursing homes, but federal regulation
111
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of the care provided by nursing homes did not begin until the passage of the
Medicare and Medicaid Acts in 1965. Throughout the 1970s, HHS monitored the
capacity of nursing homes to provide quality care, but it did not monitor whether
the nursing home was actually providing quality care until the 1980s.120 In 1987,
Congress passed a set of quality of care standards, which are still in effect, that
authorized HHS to aggressively police nursing homes.
1. Certification of Nursing Homes under Medicare prior to 1987. – In
1965, Congress enacted the Medicare and Medicaid Acts121 increasing federal
funding to nursing homes.122 Medicare funded care provided in “extended care
facilities” (“ECFs”) while skilled nursing services were funded under
Medicaid.123 To participate in either Medicare or Medicaid a facility had to meet
certain health and safety standards. Initially, the Medicare standards were so
severe that only about ten percent of the 6,000 nursing homes that applied to
participate in the program achieved full compliance.124 Another fifty percent
were allowed to participate in the program for being in “substantial compliance”
with the Medicare standards.125 Therefore, the purpose of the first nursing home
enforcement standards:
was to allow some substandard facilities to participate in the
[Medicare] program while encouraging them to achieve
compliance, rather than to bar such facilities until they were in
compliance.126
Congress amended the Medicare program in 1967 creating less rigorous
regulatory standards of participation and established intermediate care facilities
(“ICFs”) under Medicaid.127 The establishment of ICFs allowed nursing homes
that could not meet the ECF standards of Medicare or the skilled nursing services
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standards of Medicaid to receive federal funding.128 Without these changes
people who needed nursing care would have been left with no option for care.129
Nevertheless, even with these changes many nursing homes still were unable to
fulfill the requirements of Medicare or Medicaid.130
Due to nationally reported incidents of nursing home quality problems, the
Senate Finance Committee chaired by Senator Frank Moss began a series of
hearings and studies of nursing home quality from 1969 to 1973, which affected
both Medicare and Medicaid. 131 In 1971, as the Finance Committee was studying
nursing home quality, President Nixon made several speeches on the deplorable
conditions of nursing homes. During one speech in particular at a New
Hampshire nursing home, Nixon announced an eight-point plan to improve
regulation of nursing homes.132 Subsequently, Congress made several of Nixon’s
points into law, including “full federal funding of survey and certification
activities, redefined Medicare ECFs and Medicaid SNFs into ‘skilled nursing
facilities’ (“SNFs”), and directed [HHS] to develop a single set of standards for
Medicare and Medicaid SNFs.”133 Passed in 1972, the law also created a new
HHS division, the Office of Nursing Home Affairs, to conduct a “comprehensive
study” of federal policies concerning long-term care and to coordinate
enforcement efforts.134 The final survey and certification regulations were
promulgated in 1974.135
According to the experts, even though these regulations were heralded by
many for trying to address quality of care problems in nursing homes, the
regulations did little to rectify the problems for two reasons: lack of sanctioning
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power given to the states and failure to survey the patient’s actual condition.136 If
a facility was found in violation of the regulations, HHS required the states to try
to resolve the case before reporting the problem to HHS or the police.137 To
resolve the case, states were mandated to send a notice of the violations to the
facility and give the facility a 30 to 60 day grace period to correct the violation.138
Once the facility failed to reach compliance by the end of that time period, then
and only then, could the state impose the sanction of termination.139
Furthermore, HHS focused its regulation of nursing homes on the
facility’s ability to provide required services to residents in the facility, not the
quality of the services provided.140 Several efforts were made by HHS to redirect
the focus of the certification to quality of care by developing a patient oriented
assessment tool; however, these efforts failed for a plethora of reasons. First, the
tool HHS developed was too complex to use as a regulatory tool.141 Second, the
cost estimates of implementing the regulations were estimated from $135 million
to $435 million annually,142 which would have bankrupt the entire nursing home
industry. Third, the change in administration from President Carter to President
Regan ushered in a change in perspective of nursing home quality issues in the
White House and HHS.143
On July 14, 1980, HHS published new rules to shift the focus from
facility-oriented reviews to concentrate on patient care.144 President Regan
immediately rescinded these regulations, leaving the 1974 regulations in place.145
In 1981, HHS created the Task Force on Regulatory Reform to reevaluate the
proposed rules.146 The Task Force recommended to retain most of the 1980
regulations, but suggested the deletion of some sections and deference to state
law.147 This report was used to craft new regulations, which received major
protest from the public and members of Congress, so the Secretary decided to
concentrate on changing the procedures for applying the standards rather than
changing the 1974 survey and certification regulations.148 These new procedures
included reducing the inspection requirements of facilities with good compliance
136
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records and replacing government certification with accreditation by the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, the same body that
accredits hospitals.149 In May of 1982, HHS announced the implementation of
these proposed changes.150 Members of Congress and the public viewed these
changes as a means to reduce federal oversight of the nursing home industry.151
Thus, Congress imposed a moratorium on the proposed changes and ordered the
Institute of Medicine (“IOM”) of the National Academy of Sciences to study the
quality of care provided in nursing homes and publish a Report [hereinafter IOM
Report].152
To compile a study of quality of care in nursing homes, the IOM formed a
Committee consisting of twenty members with knowledge and experience in the
regulation of nursing homes.153 Data for the Report was collected from sundry
places. Public hearings were held in five different cities;154 reports from 1978
HHS hearings and congressional hearings on nursing home quality were
reviewed; surveys were mailed to every state licensure and certification director;
and case studies were conducted in six states.155 The case studies were
particularly important to the Report because Committee members conducted
interviews of all interested parties, including nursing home administrators and
federal and state regulators and conducted site visits of nursing homes.156 The
Committee compiled its research and published its recommendations in March of
1986 to change the regulation of nursing homes to ensure that residents were
provided quality care.157
According to the IOM Report, most consumers, long-term care providers,
and state regulators felt that nursing homes were safer in 1986 than prior to the
1974 regulations, but there was room for improvement.158 Consequently, the
IOM recommended forty-eight changes, “with regulatory criteria, with the
process of inspecting and certifying nursing homes, with the enforcement process,
with the ombudsman program, and with issues requiring further study.”159
Important recommended changes included eliminating the distinction between
SNFs, ECFs, and ICFs, making quality of care and life conditions of participation
149
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for both the Medicare and Medicaid program, consolidating the Medicare and
Medicaid survey and certification requirements, strengthening the federal
oversight of survey operations, and implementing a set of intermediate sanctions
to penalize nursing homes out of compliance with Medicare.160 The IOM Report
served as the basis for statutory changes in the regulation of nursing homes.161 In
addition to these recommendations, Congress used several federal court decisions
concerning nursing homes to draft the Nursing Home Reform Act.162 The most
influential case was, In re Estate of Smith v. Heckler163 in which the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit required HHS to change the Medicare and
Medicaid regulations from a facility-oriented focus to a patient and outcome
oriented approach.164
2. Judicial order for change. – Medicaid recipients residing in Colorado
nursing homes brought a class action civil rights suit165 against the Secretary in
the United States District Court for the District of Colorado.166 The Medicaid
recipients asserted that the Secretary violated their Constitutional right to receive
quality medical and psychosocial care in nursing homes by failing to fulfill his
160
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statutory duty under Medicaid to regulate the actual care provided in nursing
homes.167 The Secretary argued that HHS had fulfilled the requirements of
Medicaid by publishing advisory enforcement standards governing state
inspection of Medicaid certified nursing homes.168 Each side’s arguments
centered on the duties of the Secretary under the Medicaid Act.
The Medicaid Act authorized the Secretary to fund state plans to provide
“health care to needy persons through agreements with private and public persons
and institutions capable of providing such services.”169 Under 42 U.S.C. §
1396(a), the Secretary could only approve state plans, which included the
condition that the plan must provide a description of the methods of inspection the
state would use to certify that the nursing homes provided care of high quality.170
The Secretary had the authority to “look behind” the state’s determination of a
nursing home’s compliance with the state Medicaid plan.171 Based on the “look
behind” provision, if the Secretary found that the state plan was deficient and the
state failed to show that it had implemented an effective inspection program, the
Secretary had to reduce the percentage of federal funds given to the state’s
Medicaid program.172
The Secretary argued that the agency fulfilled its duty by promulgating
regulations and developing forms to be used by the States to certify the
compliance of nursing homes.173 However, according to the plaintiffs, these
forms were deficient because they were “facility-oriented” not “patient-oriented.”
174
The forms only required states to review the physical appearance of the
facility and theoretical capability of a nursing home to render quality care, instead
of regulating the actual care provided to patients in nursing homes, which
according to the Medicaid recipients violated the “look behind” provision.175
Agreeing with the Secretary, the court ruled that HHS had fulfilled the
167
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requirements of the Medicaid Act by promulgating regulations and providing
forms to the States, reasoning that the duty to ensure that the residents of nursing
homes received quality care was up to the Colorado Department of Health
through its licensure powers. 176
In 1984, the plaintiffs appealed the case to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.177 Reversing the district court’s decision, the court
ruled that the Secretary had violated the plaintiffs’ Constitutional rights by
promulgating a “facility-oriented” rather than a “patient-oriented” enforcement
system to regulate nursing home care.178 Because the purpose of the Medicaid
Act was to provide high quality medical care to needy persons, the court reasoned
that the use of the facility-oriented scheme, which failed to survey the quality of
patient care violated the dictates of the Medicaid Act.179 The court reviewed the
legislative history of the “look behind” provision and found that Congress passed
the law “to assure that federal matching funds are being used to reimburse only
those SNFs and ICFs that actually comply with Medicaid requirements.”180
Consequently, the court ruled that by granting the Secretary the “look
behind” authority Congress mandated the Secretary to make an independent
determination of whether a Medicaid certified nursing home actually meets the
requirements of the state plan irrespective of the State’s findings when the
Secretary had cause.181 According to Congress, cause included complaints made
to the Secretary by the residents, advocates, or others about the quality of care or
condition of the facility.182 Because the residents in this case had complained to
the Secretary about the quality of care and the Secretary failed to use his authority
under the “look behind” provision, the court remanded the case back to the district
court and ordered the court to compel the Secretary to revise and implement new
Medicaid regulations that focused on the quality of care furnished Medicaid
recipients in nursing homes.183
176

O’Halloran, 557 F. Supp. at 296.
Heckler, 747 F.2d 583 (1984).
178
Id. at 587.
179
Id. at 590.
180
H.R. REP. NO. 96-1167, at 57 (1980), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5526, 5570
177

(1990).
181

Id.; see also H.R. CONF. REP. 96-1479, at 140-41 (1980).
H.R. CONF. REP. 96-1479, at 141 (1980).
183
Heckler, 747 F.2d at 591. On June 10, 1985, the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado ordered the Secretary to promulgate new regulations
consistent with the Court of Appeals mandate. See HHS Plan of Compliance with Court
Order in Smith v. Heckler, 1985 WL 56558 (D.Colo. 1985). Nevertheless, the Secretary
failed to meet all the objectives of the order and was ordered to revise its regulations and
finally found in contempt of the order in 1987. See In re Estate of Smith v. Bowen, 656
F. Supp. 1093 (D. Colo. 1987). See also In re Estate of Smith v. Bowen, 675 F. Supp.
586 (D. Colo. 1987). In 1988, the Secretary submitted the passage of the Nursing Home
182
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This decision by the Court of Appeals, 184 not only affected Medicaid
regulations, but it also influenced the regulation of Medicare certified nursing
homes because the facility-oriented enforcement system HHS advised the States
to use in regulating Medicaid certified facilities was the same system HHS used in
regulating Medicare certified facilities.185 Thus, the decision also called into
question the validity of the Medicare regulations. This class action lawsuit,
coupled with the findings of the IOM Report, were the catalyst for significant
Congressional changes in the way that nursing homes were regulated under
Medicare.186
3. The Nursing Home Reform Act of 1987. – The Nursing Home Reform
Act, which changed the entire survey and certification process, was the
culmination of class action suits, the IOM Report, and numerous hearings held by
Congress. On March 21, 1986, Representative Claude Pepper offered the Nursing
Home Resident Protection Act of 1986 to implement and expand the IOM’s
recommendation.187 The Act included seven sections and proposed penalizing the
nursing home as well as the states for noncompliance with the Medicare and
Medicaid Acts. In fact, Section II made nursing home owners and operators
criminally liable for “harm to residents of their facilities caused by facility
negligence or other wrongdoing” and created a private right of action to allow
residents and advocates to sue nursing homes under Medicare and Medicaid for
noncompliance with the federal standards.188 Additionally, Section V provided
the federal government with the power to penalize states that did not “carry out
enforcement actions against noncompliant nursing homes” by withholding
funding for survey and certification.189 These suggestions were not enacted.190

Reform Act as means of compliance, but the court ruled that, “the passage of the OBRA
[of 1987] in no way modifies or preempts the tenth Circuit’s decision.” Smith v. Bowen,
1988 WL 235574 (D. Colo. 1988). In June, the Secretary finally enacted regulations in
compliance with the court’s order, amending both the Medicaid and Medicare
regulations. See 53 Fed. Reg. 22850-01 (June 17, 1988).
184
See O’Halloran, 557 F. Supp. at 290, rev’d sub. nom., Heckler, 747 F.2d 583.
185
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(j)(15) (2004).
186
See Beverly Health & Rehab. Servs., Inc. v. Thompson, 223 F. Supp. 2d 73,
87 (D.C. Cir. 2002). See also IOM Study on Nursing Home Regulation Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigation, Subcomm. on Health & Environment with Select
Committee on Aging, Subcomm. on Health And Long Term Care House Comm. on
Energy & Commerce, 99th Congress 8 (2d Sess. 1986) (statement of Dr. Katz, Chair, the
Committee on Nursing Home Regulation that authored the IOM Report).
187
See 132 Cong. Rec. E937-02 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1986) (statement of Rep.
Pepper).
188
Id.
189
Id.
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Four days later, the House of Representative’s Committee on Energy &
Commerce held a hearing concerning the IOM Report and examined the quality
of health care provided in nursing homes.191 The hearing centered on the
testimony of Dr. Katz, the Chair of the Committee on Nursing Home Regulation
that authored the IOM Report, who reiterated the recommendations of the
Report.192 Several more hearings were held by the Senate Special Committee on
Aging193 and the Committee on Energy and Commerce regarding nursing home
reform.194 On October 15, 1986, Representatives Pete Stark and Henry Waxman
introduced the Medicare Skilled Nursing Home Quality Care Amendments of
1986 (H.R. 5712), a companion to the Medicaid Skilled Nursing Home Quality
Care Amendments of 1986 (H.R. 5450),195 to improve the nursing home
regulatory system.196 The bill was based on the IOM’s Report but was not
enacted due to Congress’ early adjournment.197
On June 24, 1987, Representatives Pete Stark and several other
Representatives introduced the Medicare Skilled Nursing Home Quality Care
Amendments of 1987, a companion to the Medicaid Skilled Nursing Home
Quality Care Amendments of 1987 (H.R. 2270), which included significant
revisions from the bills offered in 1986 including a twenty-four hour registered
nursing staff requirement for all nursing homes.198 These bills were initially
disregarded because many Congressmen were worried that it would “have made it
impossible for small, rural ICFs to stay open because it offered no flexibility in

190

Id. Some of the proposed changes did make it into the Nursing Home Reform
Act of 1987 such as making compliance with resident’s rights to autonomy and respect a
condition of participation. Id.
191
IOM Report on Nursing Home Regulation, supra note 121 at 8; also IOM
Report, supra note 7, at 2.
192
See also IOM Study on Nursing Home Regulation Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight & Investigation, Subcomm. on Health & Environment with Select Committee
on Aging, Subcomm. on Health And Long Term Care House Comm. on Energy &
Commerce, 99th Congress 8 (1986) (statement of Dr. Katz, Chair, the Committee on
Nursing Home Regulation that authored the IOM Report).
193
A.D. Joseph Emerzian and Timothy Stampp, Nursing Home Reform: Its
Legislative History and Economic Impact Upon Nursing Homes, BENEFITS Q. 19, 24-24
(1993), citing Nursing Home Care: The Unfinished Agenda Before Special Committee on
Aging, 99th Congress (2d Sess. 1986).
194
132 CONG. REC. E3627-02 (1986).
195
132 CONG. REC. E2998-02 (1986). The bill was similar to the final Nursing
Home Reform Act of 1987 in some ways. It included all of the same sections as the
Nursing Home Reform Act of 1987, except the annual report section and the detailed
chart with effective dates.
196
132 CONG. REC. E3627-02 (1986).
197
133 CONG. REC. S8050-03 (1987).
198
133 CONG. REC. E2598-01 (1987).
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meeting the increased staffing requirements.”199 On April 29, 1987, Senator
George Mitchell and several other Senators introduced the Medicare and
Medicaid Skilled Nursing Home Quality Care Amendments of 1986 (S. 1106).200
This bill along with the H.R. 2270 became the Nursing Home Reform Act of
1987. The Senate bill noted the improvements in nursing home quality care since
1967, but noted that residents still received ‘shockingly deficient-care’ in
substandard quality nursing homes.201 The Senate bill also included a grant
program for innovative practices in nursing homes that provide a maximum
$25,000 grant to nursing homes that enhanced quality of care for residents.202
The final Nursing Home Reform Act203 was a compromise of both the Senate and
House of Representatives bills and did not include the grant provision. 204
The Nursing Home Reform Act included seven specific sections
regulating the care of Medicare and Medicaid certified nursing homes:
requirements for nursing facilities use of resident assessments, survey and
certification process, enforcement process, personal needs allowance, effective
dates, and annual repot.205 The most relevant changes were included in the survey
and certification and enforcement sections. The survey and certification section
created a system by which nursing homes would be inspected annually and the
enforcement section directed HHS to impose remedies such as denial of payment
for new admissions, civil money penalties, and temporary management.206 The
enforcement section also required HHS and the states to impose harsher remedies
for repeated noncompliance.207 In addition, to these changes the Nursing Home
Reform Act included a time table that mandated that HHS and the States make
certain changes by specific dates.208 Subsequently, HHS published a final rule
without comments on November 10, 1994 effective July 10, 1995.209 Even
though it took eight years before these regulations became effective, they still
govern the survey and certification process today.
199

133 CONG. REC. H29905-03 (1987).
133 CONG. REC. S5714-02 (1987).
201
Id.
202
Id.
203
Pub. L. No. 100-203, §§ 4201-4218, 105 Stat. 1107 (1987).
204
See generally, David Bohm, Striving for Quality Health in America’s Nursing
Homes: Tracing the History of Nursing Homes and Noting the Effect of Recent Federal
Government Initiatives to Ensure Quality Care in the Nursing Home Setting, 4 DEPAUL J.
HEALTH CARE L. 317 (2001).
205
H.R. REP. NO. 100-391 (2d Sess. 1987).
206
Id. at 465-77.
207
Id. at 474.
208
Id. at 497-99.
209
See 59 Fed. Reg. 56116 (Nov. 10, 1994); 60 Fed. Reg. 50441 (Sept. 29, 1995).
There have been no drastic changes in the regulations governing the hearing process
since these amendments.
200
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Under the current survey and certification system, once a nursing home is
certified to participate in Medicare, the home is visited every nine to fifteen
months,210 a standard survey, by a State health agency survey team211 comprised
of nurses, nutritionists, social workers, and physical therapists to certify continued
compliance with the Medicare regulations.212 If the survey team finds the nursing
home out of compliance with the Medicare regulations it cites the facility for a
deficiency213 and assigns a scope and severity level to the deficiency based on the
egregiousness of the offense. The scope is the number of residents affected and
the severity level refers to the seriousness of the harm. 214 The scope and severity
of each deficiency assigned is based on a matrix shown below in Table 1.
Table 1
Severity
Immediate
Jeopardy
Actual Harm
Potential for
more than
minimal harm,
but not
immediate

J

K

L

G
D

H
E

I
F

210

See 42 C.F.R. §§ 488.3(a)(2), (b)(2), (b)(3) (2004).
See 42 C.F.R. § 488.308(a) (2004).
212
42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(2). The majority of nursing homes are also certified to
participate in the Medicaid program. See 42 C.F.R. § 488.300 (2004). Thus, the survey
team usually cites the nursing home for both Medicare and Medicaid violations. That is
where the similarity ends. Unlike the Medicare hearing process, States usually provide
nursing homes with an opportunity to refute survey findings during an informal hearing
process. 42 C.F.R. § 488.331(a)(1) (2004). In addition, the State affords the nursing
home the opportunity to challenge all noncompliance findings in a full evidentiary
hearing. 42 C.F.R. § 431.153(i) (2004).
213
There are a total of 190 possible deficiencies divided into seventeen different
categories, for which HHS can cite a nursing home. See The Office of the Inspector
General, Nursing Home Deficiency Trends and Survey and Certification Process
Consistency 1, OEI-02-01-00600, March 2004. Most deficiencies are categorized into
three main areas: quality of care (42 C.F.R. § 483.25); quality of life (42 C.F.R. §
483.15); and resident behavior and facility practice (42 C.F.R. § 483.13).
214
42 C.F.R. § 488.404(b) (2004). The scope of the deficiency means whether
the deficiency was isolated, constituted a pattern of behavior, or was widespread. See 42
C.F.R. § 488.404(b)(2) (2004). The severity is whether a facility’s deficiencies caused:
no actual harm with a potential for minimal harm; no actual harm with a potential for
more than minimal harm, but not immediate jeopardy; actual harm that is not immediate
jeopardy; or immediate jeopardy to a resident’s health or safety. See 42 C.F.R. §
488.404(b)(1) (2004).
211
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jeopardy
No actual harm
A
with a potential
for minimal harm
Isolate

B

Pattern
Scope

C

Widespread

All of the alleged deficiencies are then recorded with the corresponding letter to
denote scope and severity level on a Statement of Deficiencies and sent to HHS
for approval.215 Once HHS approves the findings of noncompliance, it posts its
findings on its website and notifies the nursing home ombudsman, the physicians
and skilled nursing facility administration licensing board, and the State Medicaid
fraud and abuse control units.216 Upon approval from HHS, the State agency
sends a copy of the Statement of Deficiencies to the offending nursing home
along with a letter noting all the remedies imposed.217 Remedies that may be
imposed includes directed plan of correction, state monitoring, directed in-service
training, denial of payment for new admissions, denial of payment for all
Medicare patients, a civil money penalty from $50 -$10,000, and temporary
management.218 HHS also sends the nursing home a letter confirming the
imposition of a remedy and the duration of each imposed remedy.219 If the
nursing home decides to appeal the alleged noncompliance findings it bears the
burden of proof and must file a hearing request within sixty days from the date of
both the state’s and HHS’ letter.220 The hearing request is sent to HHS’ judicial
board then assigned to a specific ALJ.

215

42 C.F.R. §§ 488.330(d), 488.402(f)(1) (2004). The Statement of Deficiencies
(“SOD”) details the nursing home’s violations of the Medicare regulations and factual
incidents to support these allegations. Id. The SOD is issued prior to a nursing home
requesting a hearing. 42 C.F.R. § 488.18(b)(1) (2004).
216
42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(5). The information remains posted until the next
annual survey is conducted.
217
See 42 C.F.R. §§ 488.18(b)(1) (2004),488.402(f)(2) (2004).
218
See 42 C.F.R. § 488.404 (2004). A nursing home is out of compliance with
the Medicare regulations, if the deficiency creates more than a potential for causing
minimal harm. 42 C.F.R. § 488.301 (2004). Remedies are only imposed if a nursing
home is not in substantial compliance with the Medicare regulations. 42 C.F.R. §
488.400 (2004).
219
42 C.F.R. § 488.402 (2004).
220
42 C.F.R. §§ 498.5(k), 498.40(c)(1) (2004). Usually to preserve its hearing
rights, nursing homes must file an appeal to each letter it receives that discusses the
imposition of remedies even if the information is duplicated. See Concourse Rehab. &
Nursing v. Thompson, 2004 WL 434434 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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The hearing process varies based on which of the eight ALJs is presiding
over the case;221 hearings can last from one to five days and include only crossexamination testimony.222 Once the ALJ issues a ruling, the nursing home has
sixty days to appeal the decision to the DAB.223 After receiving a ruling from the
DAB, the nursing home may appeal the case to federal district court. This whole
hearing process usually takes a number of years to reach the federal level.224 The
current hearing system is a drastic change from the structure of initial nursing
home hearings that only allowed informal hearings for the imposition of remedies
other than termination.225
B. Expanding the Structure of Nursing Home Hearings
The structure of nursing homes hearings has always been connected to the
severity of the sanctions imposed for noncompliance. Prior to 1980, termination
was the only federal sanction that HHS could impose on nursing homes out of
compliance with the Medicare regulations.226 HHS, however, did grant the
facility a full evidentiary hearing either before termination or within 120 days
after the termination became effective.227 In 1980, with the passage of the
Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980 (“OBRA of 1980”), Congress created a new
intermediate sanction, denial of payments for new Medicare admissions, and
granted the Secretary of HHS the authority to impose this remedy for nursing
home deficiencies that did not cause immediate jeopardy228 to patients.229
221

There are eight HHS ALJs to cover all of the nursing homes cases nationwide.
The Chief ALJ is Silva and he serves with the following ALJs in order of seniority: ALJ
Kessel, Hughes, Anglada, Montano, Smith, Sickendick, and Blair.
222
Pre-hearing orders of individual ALJs (on file with the author).
223
42 C.F.R. § 498.80 (2004).
224
See Lutheran Home – Caledonia, DAB No. CR 674 (2000), aff’d DAB No.
1753 (2000); Lakewood Plaza Nursing Ctr., DAB No. CR 691 (2000), aff’d DAB No.
1767 (2001).
225
See 50 Fed. Reg. 7191, 7194 (codified as 42 C.F.R. § 442.118 (1986))
226
See 50 Fed. Reg. 7191, 7191 (Feb. 21, 1985).
227
See 50 Fed. Reg. at 7191. From 1980 to 1984, there were 967 voluntary
nursing home cancellations of participation in Medicare and only 159 terminations from
the Medicare program. IOM Report, supra note 7, at 156. HHS used termination of a
facility from Medicare as the last resort. HHS provided nursing homes with several
opportunities to become complaint through follow-up visits. Id. at 148. Even once s
facility was de-certified from the program, HHS would allow the facility to re-enter the
Medicare program, if the facility provided “reasonable assurance” that the deficiencies
that caused termination would not be repeated. STEVENS, supra note 123 at 149, citing
HHS, Survey and Certification National Review, Unpublished Briefing Materials, Health
Standards and Quality Bureau, Health Care Financing Administration (1984).
228
Immediate Jeopardy is defined as “a situation in which the provider’s
noncompliance with one or more requirements of participation has caused, or is likely to
cause, serious injury, harm, impairment, or death to a resident.” See 42 C.F.R. § 489.3
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Under this provision, a facility found out of compliance with the Medicare
regulations was first given the opportunity to develop and implement a plan of
correction for its deficiencies.230 If the facility was unable to fulfill the
requirements set forth in the plan of correction, the Secretary then had the right to
impose the sanction of denial of payments for new admissions.231 Congress
created this new process and sanction because it would “serve to protect
beneficiaries both by giving the skilled nursing facility an incentive to correct
deficiencies in a timely manner and by forestalling the need for traumatic
transfers of large numbers of patients during the time needed improvements are
being made in the facility.”232 Nevertheless, Congress cautioned the Secretary not
to use the sanction to allow facilities who placed their patients in immediate
jeopardy to stay in the Medicare program.233 Congress also created an informal
hearing process for nursing facilities to challenge the imposition of the
intermediate sanction, denial of payments for new admissions.234
Although Congress granted the Secretary the power to impose the new
sanction in 1980, HHS did not issue proposed rules to implement this authority
until 1985. 235 As directed by Congress, HHS proposed the new sanction and a
new corresponding hearing process. Before the imposition of this intermediate
sanction, the nursing home would be granted a hearing236 in front of a hearing
officer.237 This hearing allowed a nursing home the opportunity to present

(2004). The States now have the authority to impose this remedy for Medicare
violations. See 42 CFR § 488.408 (2004).
229
See Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980 (“OBRA of 1980”), Pub. L. No. 96499, §916, 94 Stat. 2599 (1980).
230
H.R. REP. NO. 96-1167, at 56 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5526,
5568-5571.
231
Id.
232
H.R. REP. NO. 96-1167, at 57. Congress recognized that states already had a
full array of sanctions for Medicaid and said that this rule would not pre-empt these
sanctions.
233
Id.
234
In creating this new hearing process, Congress clearly stated that the process
would not preclude nursing homes from seeking judicial review for factual disputes
concerning noncompliance. Id.
235
The final rule was designated as 42 C.F.R. § 442.118 (1986). The delay
between the passage of the OBRA of 1980 and the promulgation of regulations was due
to the change in administration and its focus on privatizing nursing home regulation.
236
50 Fed. Reg. 7191, 7192 (Feb. 21, 1985). In the legislative history, Congress
made a point to note that it was not altering access or the process of the full evidentiary
hearing for termination. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 96-1479, 141 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5903, 5932.
237
See 50 Fed. Reg. 7191, 7193 (Feb. 21, 1985); 51 Fed. Reg. 24484, 24487
(July 3, 1986).
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evidence in person or in writing that proved it was in substantial compliance.238
HHS would then issue a written ruling to the facility.239 Even though, HHS
granted nursing homes these hearing rights to appeal the intermediate sanction, it
specifically limited the hearing to “something less than a full evidentiary
hearing.”240 In the background discussion of the proposed rule, HHS specifically
stated, “we believe that since the imposition of a denial of payments as compared
with terminations is a lesser and temporary sanction, a hearing less than a full
evidentiary hearing would satisfy all due process requirements.”241 Therefore,
according to HHS, the hearing nursing homes received for the imposition of this
intermediate sanction would only be an “informal” one.242 Nursing homes were
only granted a full evidentiary hearing when HHS threatened termination from the
Medicare Program.243 This dichotomy between a formal and informal hearing
continued until 1987, with the passage of the Nursing Home Reform Act.244
In the Nursing Home Reform Act, Congress changed the severity of the
sanctions as well as the structure of the hearing process. These changes were
based on the recommendations made in the IOM Report.245 According to the
IOM Report, more nursing homes would comply if the sanction was imposed
prior to a hearing.246 Moreover, to prevent frivolous appeals, the IOM Committee
suggested that facilities not be given a stay from termination during the appeals
process and that deficiency findings be solely based on the events that occurred
during the survey and not the condition of the facility at the time of the hearing.247
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See 50 Fed. Reg. at 7194; 51 Fed. Reg. at 24487.
See 50 Fed. Reg. at 7194; 51 Fed. Reg. at 24491.
240
50 Fed. Reg. at 7194. See 51 Fed. Reg. at 24487.
241
See 50 Fed. Reg. at 7194.
242
Id.; see also 51 Fed. Reg. at 24487. HHS failed to provide a definition of a
full evidentiary hearing versus an informal hearing in the Federal Register, so the
definition for the Administrative Procedure Act controls. See Administrative Procedure
Act of 1946 (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1994). According to the APA, a formal hearing is
defined as, “every case of adjudication required by statute to be determined on the record
after opportunity of an agency hearing ...” Id.
243
50 Fed. Reg. 7191, 7194 (Feb. 21, 1985). Congress purposely did not alter
nursing homes access to a full evidentiary hearing to challenge termination from
Medicare. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 96-1479, 141 (1980).
244
Pub. L. No. 100-203, §§ 4201-4218, 105 Stat. 1107 (1987).
245
During the hearings, Dr. Katz, the Chair of the Committee on Nursing Home
Regulation that authored the IOM Report, recommended that the appeal process for
alleged violations of the Medicare regulations be made “less attractive” for “really bad
facilities.” See IOM Study on Nursing Home Regulation; supra note 128 at 9 &12. This
practice was implemented in the regulations, but was applied to all nursing homes
appealing alleged violations of the Medicare Act.
246
IOM Report, supra note 7, at 159.
247
Id.
239
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In response to these recommendations, in the Nursing Home Reform Act
of 1987 Congress added several more sanctions, now entitled “remedies,” to the
Medicare Program.248 Congress also mandated that HHS take into account repeat
deficiencies when imposing these remedies and made it harder for a facility that
has been terminated from Medicare program to re-enter the program.249
Additionally, Congress combined the formal hearing for termination and the
informal hearing for other sanctions into a single hearing process.250 This process
was implemented in 1995, when HHS promulgated the hearing process
regulations. The relevant regulations are 42 C.F.R. §§ 498.60,251 498.62,252 and
498.66.253 Under these new regulations nursing homes are granted the right to
present evidence in front of an ALJ,254 unlike the original informal hearing
process where nursing homes would present evidence to a hearing officer.255 The
new regulations also gave nursing homes the right to examine their own
witnesses256 and bring any participant to the hearing not limited to their
representatives and technical advisors.257 Even though, nursing homes were
granted a full evidentiary hearing, it was limited to cases in which HHS had
imposed remedies.258 Without the imposition of remedies the nursing home was
not granted any right to a hearing, but the findings remained on HHS’ website and
were used for the imposition of future remedies. Hence, nursing homes file a suit
federal court to challenge the lack of procedural Due Process protections afforded
them in Medicare compliance hearings. 259
248

H.R. REP. NO. 100-391 (2d Sess. 1987) (codified as 60 Fed. Reg. 50118
(Sept. 28, 1995)).
249
Nursing Home Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 100-203, §§ 4201-4218, 105 Stat.
1107 (1987). These sections were based on the recommendations made in the IOM
Report. IOM Report, supra note 7, at 155-156.
250
H.R. REP. NO. 100-391 (2d Sess. 1987) (codified as 52 Fed. Reg. 22444,
22447-22448 (June 12, 1987)).
251
This regulation defines the conduct of nursing home hearings, which is left to
the discretion of the ALJ within certain limits. See 42 C.F.R. § 498.60 (2004). One
particular limit is how witnesses are treated. See 42 C.F.R. § 498.62 (2004).
252
This regulation states that, “the representative of each party is permitted to
examine his or her own witnesses subject to interrogation by the representative of the
other party.” 42 C.F.R. § 498.62 (2004).
253
This rule governs nursing homes’ right to waive their right to appear and
present evidence at an in-person hearing. 42 C.F.R. § 498.66 (2004).
254
42 C.F.R. §§ 498.45, 498.60 (2004).
255
51 Fed. Reg. 24484, 24491 (July 3, 1986).
256
42 C.F.R. § 498.62 (2004).
257
42 C.F.R. § 498.60 (2004).
258
42 C.F.R. §§ 498.3(b)(13), 488.406 (2004).
259
HHS has continued to issue nursing home regulations to strengthen
enforcement. See HHS Fact Sheet, Assuring quality care for nursing home residents,
available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/media/press/release.asp?Counter=384 (last visited
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IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NURSING HOME PROCEEDINGS
The failure of HHS to actually grant nursing homes the broad procedural
Due Process rights granted in the Nursing Home Reform Act and codified in the
Medicare regulations, the right to a full evidentiary hearing for any findings of
noncompliance, was the basis of the case entitled Shalala v. Illinois Council on
Long Term Care, Inc.260 As a result of nursing homes’ dissatisfaction with the
new Medicare regulations, the Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc., on
behalf of its members, sued HHS Secretary Donna Shalala in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois for the violation of their
Constitutional right to Due Process.261 The case ultimately reached the U.S.
Supreme Court, which deferred to the Secretary’s interpretations.
A. The District Court case
Prior to the implementation of the Nursing Home Reform Act regulations,
only six percent of nursing homes in Illinois were found noncompliant,262 while in
1995 when the regulations took effect, seventy percent of nursing homes in
Illinois were found out of compliance with the regulations.263 The Illinois
Council for Long Term Care (“Council”) filed a complaint seeking injunctive and
declaratory relief from the Secretary’s and the Illinois Department of Public
Health’s use of the Medicare regulations proscribed by Congress in the Nursing
Home Reform Act, claiming that the drastic change in noncompliance rates was
due to unconstitutionally vague standards. Moreover, the Council submitted that
the appeals process to challenge noncompliance findings was meaningless and
thus violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution.
Instead of addressing these issues, HHS collaterally attacked the Council’s
claims by arguing that the federal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. §§1331264 and 1346265 to hear the case because the case arose under the
Mar. 15, 2004). As a result, a nursing home with one deficiency where the resident
suffered actual harm was traditionally assessed a civil money penalty of $100 per day.
Id. Now, however, the same facility is being fined upwards of $300 per day. Id.
260
See Ill. Council, 529 U.S. 1 (2000).
261
Ill. Council, 1997 WL 158347 (N.D.Ill. 1997).
262
Id. at *1.
263
Id.
264
“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising
under the Constitution, Laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §1331 (2004).
265
“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction concurrent, with the
Federal Court of Claims of any civil claim against the United States for the recovery of
any internal-revenue tax or any other civil action or claim against the United States, not
exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of
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Medicare Act.266 Under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 405(h), federal courts are barred
from reviewing any Social Security action under 28 U.S.C. §§1331 and 1346
before HHS has issued a final ruling. Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) limits
federal review to final decisions issued by the Secretary. This review is further
limited by 42 U.S.C. § 405(h), which prohibits federal review of claims based on
federal question jurisdiction unless the statute authorizes review and the Secretary
issues a final decision. This bar to federal review before a final decision from the
Secretary was incorporated into the Medicare Act by 42 U.S.C. §§1320a-7a(c)(2)
and (j)(1).267
The requirements in 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) & (h) allowed the Secretary to
channel all nursing home claims through the agency in a special review process.
Because the Council bypassed this process in filing this case, HHS asserted the
district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction. Based on this bar, HHS
requested that the court dismiss the case because the Council never presented the
case to HHS and failed to receive a final agency ruling before presenting the issue
to federal court.268 In response to HHS’ arguments, the Council contended that
the district court did have subject matter jurisdiction because: the claims did not
arise under the Medicare Act; HHS had no authority to decide Constitutional or
statutory challenges; there was no other avenue for judicial review of Due Process
claims and thus under Bowen immediate federal review was appropriate; and
some claims arose under the Medicaid Act, which did not include a subject matter
jurisdiction bar.269
First, the court found that the Council’s complaints did arise under the
Medicare Act because the complaints addressed the failure of HHS to comply
with the Medicare Act, required the analysis of provisions of the Medicare Act,
and the resolution of the case would directly impact the “applicability and
enforceability of the Medicare Act.”270 Second, although only the federal courts
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have the authority to decide consitutional or statutory challenges271 and the
Medicare regulations specifically state that the Secretary will not hear appeals
challenging the method of the survey or the choice of remedies,272 the court ruled
that 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) & (h) requried these challenges to first be presented to
HHS for resolution. Presuming that the central reason for the Council’s case was
the attainment of benefits, the court reasoned that the federal review bar would
allow the “Secretary an opportunity prior to Constitutional litigation to determine
whether plaintiff’s claims are either invalid or resolvable under some other
provision of the Medicare Act.”273
Third, the the court held that the exception for immediate federal review
created by the Supreme Court in Bowen no longer applied to Medicare cases.274
In Bowen, the Supreme Court ruled that physician challenges concerning the
receipt of benefits under Medicare Part B could be heard in federal court prior to
presentment of the issue to HHS because there was no other avenue for review in
HHS.275 Given that Congress revised the Medicare Act to grant hearing rights to
all providers under the Medicare Act after the Bowen case, the court ruled that the
Bowen exceptio was void and the Council had to present the case first to HHS.276
Finally, the court determined that any resolution of the Council’s Medicaid issues
would effect Medicare, allowing the nursing home to get their Medicare claims in
through the back door.277
Summarily rejecting all of the Council’s contentions, the district court
dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jursidiction. The Council appealed
the dismissal to the United States Court of Appeal for the Seventh Circuit, which
reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case to the district court
for further review.
B.

Upon Appeal to the Seventh Circuit

In its appeal to the Seventh Circuit, the Council reasserted its claims that
the regulations violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because
the regulations were too vague and failed to provide any opportunity to be heard
271
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before penalties were imposed.278 Additionally, the Council argued that the State
Operations Manual used by state surveyors had not undergone the notice and
comment period required by the APA and thus could not be used by HHS to
regulate nursing homes.279 The Secretary again asserted that the Medicare claims
were not reviewable based on 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) & (h).280 HHS also asserted
that the Medicaid claims were not ripe.281 To resolve the issue, the court
reviewed three prominent Supreme Court cases: Salfi,282 Ringer,283 and Bowen.284
According to the Seventh Circuit, even though the Council’s challenges
were based on the Constitution and the APA, the Supreme Court said in Salfi and
Ringer that any claims for payments arise under the Medicare Act and claims
arising under Medicare regardless of the legal theory must be channeled through
the administrative process.285 But in Bowen, the Supreme Court held that as
applied to Medicare, 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) addressed “only amount determinations,
that is calculations of reimbursement by the fiscal intermediary that implement
the Medicare program and that matters which Congress did not delegate to private
carriers, such as challenges to the validity of the Secretary’s instructions and
regulations are cognizable in course of law.”286 The Seventh Circuit followed the
Bowen decision, which presented an exception to the subject matter jurisdiction
bar of federal review for cases that would not otherwise have any meaningful
review.287 The Secretary restated its arguments from the district court, that the
Bowen exception to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) & (h) only applied to claims that would
never reach federal courts, but because Congress amended the Medicare Act this
exception was void.288 According the Seventh Circuit, Bowen did not create an
exception as the Secretary asserted and the district court accepted.289 Rather,
Bowen said that the legislative history of 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) & (h) only applied
to “amount determinations.”290
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the Supreme Court’s
precedent did not support the Secretary’s arguments.291 In an immigration case
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decided in 1991, the Supreme Court reiterated the rule created in Bowen that 42
U.S.C. § 405(h) did not require Medicare regulatory challenges to be channeled
through the agency if the challenge was separate from reimbursement requests.292
The Seventh Circuit had also ruled several times since Bowen that there was a
difference between pre-enforcement challenges to Medicare regulations that are
allowed and requests for payments that are barred until a final decision by the
Secretary.293 For the aforementioned reasons, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals vacated the district court’s decision and remanded the case for further
review, ruling that the exhaustion requirement of 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) & (h) did
not prohibit the Council from bringing their Constitutional challenges.294
C.

The Final Answer: the Supreme Court

HHS appealed the Seventh Circuits ruling to the Supreme Court,
reiterating its contention that federal courts did not have subject matter
jurisdiction over the case and thus the case should have been dismissed.295 The
Council argued that: (1) certain terms in the Medicare regulations such as
“substantial compliance” were unconstitutionally vague; (2) the regulations and
the State Operations Manual would allow inconsistent survey results in violation
of 42 U.S.C. §1395i-3(g)(2)(D) and exceeded the mandate of the Medicare Act;
(3) the regulations created administrative procedures inconsistent with the Due
Process Clause; and (4) the State Operations Manual and other publications used
by surveyors in citing nursing homes for deficiencies was not promulgated in
accordance with the rulemaking requirements mandated by the APA.296 Before
resolving the Council’s substantive claims, the Court first had to determine
whether it had subject matter jurisdiction by discussing its precedent.
In Salfi, the Court ruled that 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) created a nonwaivable
and nonexcusable requirement that an individual present a claim to the Secretary
before seeking federal review when the claim arose under the Social Security
292
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Act.297 A claim arose under the Social Security Act when the Act provided “both
the standing and the substantive basis for the presentation of th[e] Constitutional
contentions.”298 Because the class members included requests for the payment of
Social Security benefits, making it clear that the claims arose under the Social
Security Act, the Court dismissed the claims of all the members.299 The Court in
Ill. Council noted that the Council’s arguments did not contain any claim for
benefits like the parties in Salfi but was still barred by the channeling provision by
the Court’s decision in Ringer. The Court in Ringer ruled that 42 U.S.C. § 405(h)
prevented federal review of a challenge to the Secretary’s issuance of an
administrative ruling denying reimbursement for a particular medical procedure
where “both the standing and substantive basis for the presentation” of a claim is
the Medicare Act.300
Based on these cases, the Court in Ill. Council reasoned that 42 U.S.C. §
405(h) was a channeling provision that required all cases to be presented to the
agency.301 Furthermore, the Court ruled that the requirement was more than an
exhaustion requirement, which provides for exceptions to presentment, but an
absolute requirement.302 Even though the Court noted that this ruling might cause
some hardship, the complexities of Medicare and the need for the Secretary to
have an opportunity to “apply, interpret, or revise policies, regulations, or statutes
without possibly premature interference by different individual courts applying
ripeness and exhaustion exceptions on a case by case basis” justified this
channeling procedure.303 Additionally, the Court found no reason to distinguish
between how 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) was applied to amount determinations versus
Constitutional challenges.304 The Council submitted that the Court’s decisions in
McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc.,305 Eldridge,306 and Bowen307 provided
exceptions to this absolute channeling rule.
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In response to the Council’s arguments the Court ruled that the decision in
McNary involved different language and a different statute, which precluded any
review of claims even after a final decision from the agency.308 Thus, according
to the Court, if McNary had come under the Medicare Act then it would have
been barred from federal review.309 The Court in Ill. Council ruled that in
Eldridge, the claimant seeking Social Security disability benefits had presented
the case first to the agency as required by 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) unlike the
Council.310 Even though, Eldridge had not completed the process and received a
final ruling, presentment was enough because his Constitutional claims were
collateral to his claims for benefits according to the Court in Ill. Council.311
Hence, the decision in Eldridge did not assist the Council because the failed to
present their case to HHS.312
The Court in Ill. Council also ruled that the exception to 42 U.S.C. §
405(h) announced in Bowen, only applied in instances when the provision would
foreclose any review because a serious Constitutional issue would be raised if 42
U.S.C. § 405(h) was constructed to deny, rather than delay judicial review of
Constitutional claims.313 Moreover, the Court rejected the Seventh Circuit’s
decision that Bowen created a new rule that 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) only applied to
amount determinations because it would overrule Salfi and Ringer. The Court
opined that in Bowen if it had planned to overrule these cases then it would have
said so in its opinion. 314 The difference between Salfi/Ringer and Bowen is the
difference between postponement of review (Salfi and Ringer) and total
preclusion (Bowen).315 Consequently, the Court reviewed the Council’s claims to
ascertain whether the regulations would prevent any judicial review, and thus
whether the Bowen exception applied.
The Council argued that HHS’ application of its channeling provision to
the portion of the Medicare statute and regulations governing nursing home
hearings amounted to the “practical equivalent of a total denial of judicial
review.”316 According to the Council, nursing homes were granted access to the
special review process only when termination was imposed, not when the
Secretary imposed any other remedy.317 The Secretary asserted that any
307
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“dissatisfied” nursing home was entitled to have reviewed any determination that
it failed to comply substantially with the statute, agreements, or regulations,
regardless of the remedy imposed during the normal hearing process.318 The
Court deferred to the Secretary’s interpretation because it was reasonable.319
The Council also argued that under 42 C.F.R. § 498.3(b)(12), unless a
remedy was imposed no hearing was granted. If no remedy was imposed, then a
nursing home could fail to complete a plan of correction; however, the Secretary
could then terminate the facility from Medicare participation.320 No facility
would risk termination to bring a Constitutional challenge, so these regulations
precluded federal review. This is unconstitutional because the findings are used
in later surveys as a means for harsh sanctions and are posted on the Internet.321
The Secretary summarily denied these practices and asserted that only minor
penalties would be imposed for failing to submit a plan of correction.322 The
Secretary also stated that HHS does not “cause providers to suffer more severe
penalties in later enforcement actions based on findings that are unreviewable,”
but conceded that the findings of noncompliance remain on the internet with a
place for the nursing home to post a reply.323
Based on the Secretary’s representations of the HHS hearing process for
nursing homes, the Court reasoned that its interpretation would not absolutely bar
nursing homes from obtaining judicial review.324 Although the Court found that
the language of the statute and 42 C.F.R. 498.3 was not free from ambiguity, 325
the Secretary’s interpretation that nursing homes were permitted to a hearing for
findings of noncompliance and had access to a special review channel for these
hearings was reasonable and legally permissible.326 The Court further reasoned
that the:
procedural Medicare regulations327 limiting the extent to which the
agency itself would provide the administrative review channel
leading to judicial review ... does not amount to a denial of review
so as to entitle challenger to avoid special review channel created
under Medicare statutes, but, rather, the challenger remains free,
318
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after following the special review route, to contest in court the
lawfulness of any regulation or statute upon which an agency
determination depends.328
The Council also challenged the regulatory procedures that prevented
challenges to the level of nursing noncompliance or imposition of penalty.329
Because the Council brought this suit as a preemptory challenge to the regulations
it was unable to provide specific facts to rebut the Secretary’s claims. The Court
noted, however, that even if in individual cases the process resulted in a denial of
judicial review, the Bowen exception was based on preclusion of review for an
entire industry rather than the hardship of just one individual.330 In cases in which
the hardship was not industry wide, the Court deferred to the agency process
because it provides the agency opportunity to “apply, interpret, or revise policies,
regulations, or statutes without possibly premature interference by different
individual courts applying ripeness and exhaustion exceptions on a case by case
basis,” but the agency can waive steps in process to reach federal court or the
court can waive those steps even when no hearing has been held.331
The Court’s decision in Il. Council limited the application of the Bowen
exception to section 405(h) to cases in which there was no agency hearing
process. Thus, because Medicare regulations mandated a hearing process for
nursing homes challenging deficiencies, nursing homes had to present its case to
HHS and receive a final agency ruling before submitting a case in federal court.
Currently, HHS is not complying with the mandated hearing process of the
Medicare regulations.
Specifically, the Secretary’s interpretation of the
regulations that govern the nursing home hearing process, upon which the Court
relied, was never adopted by the agency.332 Nursing homes do not have the right
to appeal determinations of noncompliance unless a certain remedy is imposed.333
Moreover, nursing homes are not granted access to a full evidentiary hearing
leaving nursing homes without the procedural due process rights that the Court
relied upon in its ruling.
V. THE REALITY OF NURSING HOME HEARINGS AFTER SHALALA:
A RIGHT TO NO MEANINGFUL REVIEW, THROUGH WRITTEN
SUBMISSIONS
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The Secretary’s interpretations of the regulations in Ill. Council are
contrary to what actually happens within the nursing home hearing process. 334
Hence, as the Council argued in Ill. Council, the prohibition of federal review of
Constitutional challenges prior to presentment and final ruling by HHS amounts
to the “practical equivalent of a total denial of judicial review.”335 Nursing homes
are prevented from receiving any evidentiary hearing unless HHS imposes
appealable remedies or termination. This directly contradicts the Secretary’s
interpretation of the Medicare regulations offered in Ill. Council, upon which the
Court relied in makings its decision to bar nursing homes from federal courts.336
Once a nursing home is granted a hearing, the hearing process is so limited that
there is no meaningful review of claims. The ALJs have begun to limit the
hearing process to written direct testimony and in-person cross-examination. This
is contrary to the Medicare Act and regulations, the Congressional intent of the
Medicare Act and regulations, and the rules of the APA § 554.
A. The Right to No Meaningful Review
In Ill. Council, the Secretary stated, “any ‘dissatisfied’ nursing home was
entitled to review any determination that it failed to comply substantially with the
statute, agreements, or regulations, whether termination or some other remedy
was imposed.”337 Even though the Secretary offered a clear interpretation of 42
C.F.R. § 498.3 in Ill. Council, the rest of HHS, including HHS counsel and ALJs,
do not abide by this interpretation. Beginning in 1996, four years prior to the
ruling in Ill. Council and continuing through the present, HHS attorneys have
filed Motions to Dismiss in nursing home cases where the remedy imposed has
been rescinded but the allegations of noncompliance remain posted on the internet
and within the nursing home’s compliance file for use in future inspections.338
334
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In six cases339 decided by ALJs where HHS did not impose remedies, the
ALJ dismissed the cases reasoning that the nursing home did not have a right to a
hearing under the regulations if no remedy was imposed. 340 For instance the first
case decided by HHS on this issue was Arcadia Acres, Inc. v. HCFA.341 In
Arcadia Acres, the facility challenged findings of noncompliance based on
surveys conducted on November 21, 1995 and January 18, 1996. HHS sent
Arcadia Acres a latter on March 4, 1996 imposing the remedy of denial of
payments for new admissions, which HHS rescinded on April 1, 1996. Arcadia
Acres timely filed its hearing request, but the ALJ granted HHS’ Motion to
Dismiss. HHS asserted that the 42 C.F.R. § 498.3(b)(12)342 of the Medicare
regulations only provided a nursing home a right to a hearing once a remedy was
imposed. Arcadia Acres contended that HHS would use these noncompliance
findings to determine the amount of penalties for future noncompliance findings.
Arcadia Acres asked the ALJ to proceed “to a hearing on the findings of
deficiencies in order to protect against ‘injustice’ resulting from unjust and
inadequate survey results and because, ‘[i]f not in the instant appeal, where else
will Arcadia Acres have a forum?’”343
To resolve the case, the ALJ referred to the Secretary’s response during
the notice and comment period of 42 C.F.R. § 498.3(b)(12), which said:
Comment: Several commenters wanted a right to appeal all
deficiencies even if no remedy was imposed.
Response: We are not accepting this suggestion because if no
remedy is imposed the provider has suffered no injury calling for
appeal.
(emphasis added).344 Thus, the ALJ ruled in favor of HHS because when
promulgating the compliance regulations the Secretary specifically rejected the
claim that any dissatisfied nursing home had a right to appeal noncompliance
findings unlessa r emedy was imposed. The ALJ further held that the possibility
of HHS’ imposing sanctions against the facility in the future on the basis of its
(2002); Southwood Care Ctr., DAB No. CR1029 (2003); Highlands at Brighton, DAB
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findings of noncompliance was speculative and outside any definition of “initial
determination” entitling the facility to a hearing under 42 C.F.R. §§498.3(b)(13)
& (d) and 488.330(e)(3).
Contrary to the ALJ’s holding in Arcadia Acres, this practice is not
speculative and does cause nursing homes financial and reputation harm. HHS
does regularly use these unappealable findings of noncompliance that are not
adjudicated for future actions as mandated by the federal regulations.345 In fact,
according to 42 C.F.R. § 488.404, HHS is mandated to consider the nursing
home’s history of noncompliance in determining which remedies to impose.346
Moreover, 42 C.F.R. § 488.438 requires HHS to consider a facility’s history of
noncompliance and any repeat deficiencies when determining the amount of civil
money penalty it will impose.347 Thus, HHS consistently penalizes a nursing
home for these unappealable findings of noncompliance. Not only does this
contradict the Secretary’s statements in Ill. Council that nursing homes are
afforded hearing rights regardless of whether a remedy is imposed, but it also
contradicts the ALJ’s finding in Arcadia Acres, Inc. that nursing homes are
afforded all rights of due process under the regulations. This practice also
prevents nursing homes from any meaningful review to challenge the alleged
noncompliance findings that remain part of the public record of the nursing home.
In reviewing the nursing homes case in Ill. Council, the Supreme Court
focused on the fact that even if HHS’ administrative review process barred the
claims of some the process was still meaningful because it did not bar an entire
industry and served the objectives of the exhaustion doctrine: allowing the agency
to apply, interpret, or revise policies, regulations, or statutes without possibly
premature interference by different individual courts applying ripeness and
exhaustion exceptions on a case by case basis.”348 The practice of HHS does bar
the entire industry from obtaining review because no nursing home has the right
to review if a remedy is not imposed. Furthermore, because the nursing homes
cases are summarily dismissed each time the objectives stated in Ill.Council are
not meet. There is no opportunity for Secretary to correct errors and no record is
complied for the federal court because cases are summarily dismissed without any
record.349 Furthermore, Constitutional arguments do not appear on the record
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because ALJs either ignore arguments or dismiss them before the nursing home
can preserve its arguments.350
Hence, the nursing home industry should be allowed to bring cases in
federal court for review without having to present claims to HHS and receiving a
final ruling from HHS, because just like the physicians in Bowen, the nursing
home industry has been left without access to any meaningful review. Even when
nursing homes are afforded a hearing, the hearing process conducted is minimal at
best. In fact, the actual hearing process has been limited to the submission of all
direct testimony through affidavits and in-person cross-examination.351 Although
the current Medicare regulations that grant nursing homes procedural Due Process
guarantee a right to a full evidentiary hearing on the record,352 ALJs of HHS have
seemingly reverted back to the “informal hearing” process used by HHS in 1986,
without any formal change in the rules.
B. Full Evidentiary Hearings Through Written Submission
Beginning in 2002, some of the eight ALJ’s decided to reconsider what 42
C.F.R. Part 498 meant when it said a full and fair hearing must be conducted. 353
Three of the ALJs began to require that all direct testimony of witnesses be
submitted through written submissions, only allowing the participants to crossexamine witnesses at their full evidentiary hearing.354 The ALJ’s, employees of
HHS, made this modification without issuing any new rulings, regulations, or
policy memos justifying this change. These changes are arbitrarily applied -- not
all ALJs prevent in-court testimony -- and directly contradict the plain language
of the statute and regulations governing nursing home hearings, are contrary to
Congress’ intent when it created the full evidentiary hearing process, and violate
the APA.355
1. Plain Language of Medicare Statute and Regulations. - Section 1320a7a(c)(2) of the Medicare Act mandates that nursing homes be granted:
(2002); Southwood Care Ctr., DAB No. CR1029 (2003); Highlands at Brighton, DAB
No. CR1104 (2003); Manorcare Health Services Sandia, DAB No. CR1255 (2004).
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See Judicial Order from ALJ Kessel regarding pre-hearing submissions. (on
file with author).
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According to 42 C.F.R. Part 498, which governs the hearing process, inperson witness testimony is a required element of the nursing home hearing. Id. In fact,
the regulations state that witnesses will testify at the in-person hearing, without any
mention that this testimony is limited to cross-examination. Id.
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See Judicial order from ALJ Kessel regarding pre-hearing submissions. (On
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an opportunity for the determination to be made on the record after
a hearing at which the person is entitled to be represented by
counsel, to present witnesses and to cross-examine witnesses
against the person.
(emphasis added).356 This was further codified in the Medicare regulations.357
According to 42 C.F.R. § 498.60, the ALJ must inquire fully into all matters at
issue and receive into evidence the testimony of witnesses and any documents that
are relevant and material at the in-person hearing.358 Clearly, this means that
witnesses are required to present their entire testimony at the in-person hearing,
because the regulation does not distinguish between direct or cross examination of
witnesses. This regulation further states that the ALJ decides the order in which
the evidence and the arguments of the parties are presented and the conduct of the
hearing.359 Although, ALJs may decide the conduct of the hearing, this authority
is limited by 42 C.F.R. § 498.62, which governs witness’s testimony.360 The
regulation states:
The representative of each party is permitted to examine his or her
own witnesses subject to interrogation by the representative of the
other party. The ALJ may ask any questions that he or she deems
necessary. The ALJ rules upon any objection made by either party
as to the propriety of any question.
(emphasis added).361 Therefore, according to 42 C.F.R. §498.62, a witness’ entire
testimony shall be given at the in-person hearing so that the ALJ may ask
questions and rule upon objections.
Furthermore, if direct testimony is in the form of an affidavit, the ALJ will
not be able to ask timely questions regarding the witnesses’ testimony which may
serve to clarify some disputed issues of material fact. Also, the questions asked of
witnesses never appear in their affidavit. Therefore, the opportunity for parties to
make objections “to the propriety of any question” as required by 42 C.F.R.
§498.62 is non-existent. Instead of being granted the opportunity to keep
inadmissible statements out of evidence, parties are limited to filing broad
motions to strike witness statements, requiring the ALJ to review the statement
and then determine its admissibility. Moreover, the submission of direct
testimony through affidavits violates the requirements of 42 C.F.R. §498.66.
356
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According to 42 C.F.R. §498.66, a party must file a written waiver of the
right to appear and present evidence to waive its right to an oral hearing.362 In
fact, 42 C.F.R. §498.66 states that an oral hearing must be conducted unless “an
affected party wishes to waive its right to appear and present evidence at the
hearing,” by filing “a written waiver with the ALJ.”363 Even when a nursing
home has not submitted a written waiver of its right to appear and present
evidence, ALJs are implementing these policies. This contravenes the plain
meaning of the regulation, because in these cases there has been no admission of
fact by either party; thus, the ALJ must conduct an oral hearing because it is
“necessary to clarify the facts at issue.”364 Furthermore, some ALJs intentionally
disregard the legislative and agency history behind the creation of a formal
agency hearing process when they fail to grant a full evidentiary hearing.
2. Congressional and Agency Intent. – In 1986, nursing homes were only
granted limited procedural due process rights to challenge the intermediate
sanction365 of denial of payments for new Medicare admissions.366 However, in
1987, Congress abolished this informal hearing process and granted nursing
homes to a formal hearing.367 . In 1995, HHS implemented these changes and
promulgated new hearing regulations, re-structuring the hearing process to
include the right to a full evidentiary hearing before an ALJ if there were genuine
issues of material fact in dispute.368 These rights included witnesses testifying at
hearing.369 Therefore, it is clear from these changes HHS intended to give
nursing homes a full evidentiary for both termination and remedies.370
Additionally, when the nursing home hearing process is compared to the hearing
process of laboratories, it is clear that HHS intended to grant nursing homes the
right to a full evidentiary hearing.
One of the main purposes of granting nursing homes the right to a hearing
was to afford them the right to effectively challenge HHS’ findings of
noncompliance.371 Furthermore, when HHS wanted to limit an agency’s hearing
process it was quite clear. For example, when HHS created a hearing process for
362
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laboratories under the Clinical Improvement Amendments of 1988 (“CLIA”)372
codified in Subpart D of 42 C.F.R. Part 488, HHS specifically limited the rights of
laboratories.373 According to 42 C.F.R. § 488.201, a laboratory dissatisfied with
HHS’ determination has a right to seek reconsideration regardless of whether a
remedy has been imposed.374 CLIA laboratories are given an informal hearing in
front of a hearing officer.375 In addition, laboratories are allowed to present
witness testimony at the hearing.376 Although laboratories are afforded these
rights, this process is only minimal compared to nursing home hearings.
First, the process for laboratories is entitled “informal hearing”377 while
the process for nursing homes is called a “hearing.”378 Second, the hearing
process for laboratories is conducted in front of a hearing officer,379 while nursing
homes have the right to present evidence to an ALJ.380 Furthermore, laboratories
are limited to who can be witnesses and participants in the informal hearing,381
whereas, nursing home are granted the unlimited option of bringing to the hearing
anyone whose “presence the ALJ considers necessary or proper.”382 Hence, when
HHS wanted to limit the due process rights afforded in a hearing it stated so
clearly in the regulations governing laboratories. Notwithstanding these facts,
some ALJs have rejected this change in the regulations some seventeen years later
by requiring nursing homes to submit direct testimony through affidavits reverting
back to an “informal hearing” process. HHS did not state that nursing homes
were only entitled to an informal hearing, so nursing homes are entitled to a full
evidentiary hearing. Furthermore, once Congress and HHS provided nursing
homes with a hearing on the record, APA §554 requires that nursing homes be
granted a full evidentiary hearing.
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On October 31 1988, the Clinical Improvement Amendments of 1988
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3. The Administrative Procedure Act. – Section 554 of the APA provides
that:
every case of adjudication required by statute to be determined on
the record after opportunity of an agency hearing.383
(emphasis added). Before the section 554 of the APA can apply, the statute must
clearly mandate a hearing on the record. Moreover, the Supreme Court has “also
implied that formal adjudication procedures are only necessary when a statue uses
the magic words ‘on the record’.”384 Thus, HHS is required to provide nursing
homes a right to a hearing if the Medicare statute provides a hearing on the
record. This proposition was recently affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit in the case styled, Crestview Parke Care Ctr. v. Thompson.385
In Crestview, a skilled nursing home located in Ohio was surveyed by the
Ohio Department of Health on August 29, 1999, and found out of compliance
with the Medicare regulations.386 The Ohio Department of Health revisited the
facility four times before finding the facility in compliance on October 21,
1999.387 HHS imposed a $400 a day civil money penalty from October 2nd to
October 21st.388 Crestview appealed the imposition of the $400 a day civil money
penalty challenging the facts supporting the penalty to an ALJ on December 30,
1999. Crestview and HHS participated in a pre-hearing conference with the ALJ
on September 10, 2001.389 Subsequently, the parties exchanged pre-hearing
briefs. On December 12, 2001, the ALJ informed the parties that the case would
be resolved without an in-person hearing because there were no genuine issues of
material fact.390 The ALJ ruled in favor of HHS, finding that the $400 civil
money penalty and the DAB affirmed the ALJ’s ruling.391 Crestview appealed
the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
The Court ruled that nursing homes had a right to an in-person hearing based
on APA § 554 and the Medicare statute and regulations.392 The Court held that
APA § 554 provided a right to an in-person hearing if the statute required the
383
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agency to grant an opportunity to be heard on the record.393 Because section
1320a-7a(c)(2) of the Social Security Act guaranteed nursing homes the right to a
hearing on the record with in-person witness testimony, the Court held that
Crestview was entitled to an in-person hearing.394 Even with this ruling, some
ALJs still limit the hearing to in-person cross-examination.395
Nursing homes have no right to a hearing to challenge any finding of
noncompliance and even when granted a hearing there is no meaningful review
because some ALJs are limiting the formal hearing process to written direct
testimony and in-person cross-examination. HHS reasons that without the
imposition of the remedy, nursing homes are not harmed. However, this is not the
case. HHS is required under 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(5) to report their findings to
the public by posting it on their website. This is harm to the nursing home’s
reputation. Additionally, HHS is required under 42 C.F.R. §§ 488.404 and
488.438 to take into consideration the compliance history of the facility, which
includes these unreviewable findings of noncompliance. This causes nursing
home’s financial harm.
When a nursing home actually gains access to the hearing process some ALJS
have limited the hearing process to in-person cross-examination directly
contradicting the plain language of the Medicare Act and regulations, the intent of
the Medicare Act and regulations, and the APA. Thus, when the Supreme Court
ruled in Ill. Council that nursing homes were prohibited by 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g)
and (h) from seeking federal court review unless the nursing home presented that
case to HHS and received a final ruling, the Court effectively barred nursing
homes from any meaningful review. To resolve these issues nursing homes could
file a lawsuit with proof that the hearing process is meaningless or HHS could
comply with the Medicare regulations.
C. Solutions
To preserve fairness and Due Process in Medicare compliance hearings,
HHS should return to providing nursing homes with a full evidentiary hearing that
includes witness testimony. To ensure timely resolution of cases to protect the
lives of nursing home residents and permit nursing homes an opportunity to
protect their financial interests and reputation, HHS should also hire more ALJS
to hear cases. If a nursing home is not afforded a hearing, then HHS should post
the facility’s hearing request on their website along with their alleged noncompliance findings.
393
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Finally, HHS should automatically waive the finality requirement for
Constitutional challenges so that nursing homes can immediately enter federal
court. This would allow HHS to save time and money bypassing menial debates
concerning compliance when the nursing home is only challenging the
Constitutionality of the procedures used. The implementation of these solutions
would not entail any additional expense and would actually improve the system
for the benefit of the nursing homes as well as the residents. The timely
resolution of nursing home compliance hearings ensures that instead of wasting
time on fight allegations of noncompliance the nursing home can focus on the
quality of residents.
CONCLUSION
The failure of Federal administrative agencies to provide the Due Process
rights guaranteed by the agency’s governing statute, regulations, and policy
statements contravenes the protections guaranteed by the Due Process Clause: the
fundamental right of Americans regulated by the federal government to receive
due process of law when deprived of life, liberty, or property. HHS’ limitation of
nursing homes’ hearing rights is one example of this contravention.
Understandably, the money spent by HHS justifies rigorous regulation of nursing
homes to ensure that residents receive quality care. However, arbitrary and
capricious regulation of nursing homes that leaves them without any avenue to
challenge the agency’s actions violates the procedural Due Process rights
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The Supreme
Court’s ruling in Ill. Council upholding the bar to federal review until
presentment to HHS and a final agency ruling, even if the claims are
Constitutional in nature, created a fundamental flaw in the nursing home hearing
process. Nursing homes cannot obtain agency review for certain claims and thus
are barred from federal review, yet these unreviewable claims are then used
against them in later proceedings.396
This abrogation of rights has pushed the industry to near collapse, because
not only do alleged violations of Medicare regulations serve as the basis for
Medicaid actions,397 but these findings are also used by insurance companies in
determining yearly insurance premiums for nursing homes.398 Therefore,
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procedural due process rights,399 or lack thereof, afforded nursing homes during
hearings to challenge alleged violations of the Medicare regulations are
paramount to a nursing home’s continued operation. To comply with the
Medicare statute and regulations, HHS should provide nursing homes with timely
full evidentiary hearings and allow facilities with Constitutional challenges that
the agency has no authority to decide proceed to federal court. By putting these
solutions into place, HHS can streamline the process so that cases are quickly and
fairly resolved, while still protecting the care provided nursing home residents.

insurance rates, tied to litigation costs and the quality of care, have increased on average
1,000 percent since 1998. Id.
399
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